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Abstract
Most economic problems combining risk and equity have been stud-
ied under utilitarianism. As an alternative, we study consumption
decisions under risk assuming a prioritarian social welfare function.
Under a standard assumption about the utility function (i.e., decreas-
ing absolute risk aversion), there is always more current consumption
under ex ante prioritarianism than under utilitarianism. Thus, a con-
cern for equity (in the ex ante prioritarian sense) means less concern
for the risky future. In contrast, under standard utility and social
welfare functions, there is less current consumption under ex post pri-
oritarianism than under utilitarianism.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we examine the implications for consumption under risk of
using a prioritarian social welfare function (hereafter SWF) of the formP

(()) (1)
where () is the utility function of consumption  in period , and where
() is strictly increasing and strictly concave. More precisely, we derive
interpretable conditions so that there is more or less consumption under
prioritarianism compared to utilitarianism (i.e., the case where  is linear).
The concept of prioritarianism has its root in contemporary philosophy
(Parfit 1991, Nagel 1995). Essentially, prioritarianism means that one must
give priority to the less well off. While a utilitarian social planner maximizes
the sum of utilities and is thus indifferent to the distribution of utilities, a
prioritarian social planner maximizes the sum of a strictly concave trans-
formation () of utilities, and thus gives greater priority to welfare changes
affecting relatively worse-off individuals.1 In economics, the form (1) has
been extensively used in social choice and in the optimal taxation literature
(Sen 1970, Lambert 1983, Kaplow 2008). It is also sometimes used in policy
evaluation when “distributional weights” capture the nonlinearity in  and
in  (Johansson-Stenman 2005, Adler 2013).
The use of a prioritarian SWF has an interesting moral dimension for
the choice between risky prospects. Indeed, one can distinguish between ex
ante and ex post prioritarianism. The ex ante prioritarian decision maker
maximizes the sum of transformed expected utilities, while the ex post prior-
itarian decision maker maximizes the expectation of the sum of transformed
utilities. As a result, the ex post prioritarian decision maker cares about the
difference in utilities ex post, once the risk is resolved. In contrast, the ex
1In particular, unlike utilitarianism, prioritarianism leads to a strict preference for a
mean-preserving contraction of utilities. In other words, a prioritarian SWF satisfies the
Pigou-Dalton axiom: a non-leaky, non-rank-switching transfer of utility from someone
at a higher utility level to someone at a lower level should be seen as an improvement.
The other axioms leading to (1) are Pareto, anonymity, continuity and separability. See
Adler (2012) for an extensive discussion of prioritarianism. Note that there exists an
axiomatic foundation to prioritarianism based on an extension of Harsanyi’s utilitarian
impartial observer theorem and coined “generalized utilitarianism” (Grant et al. 2010).
For a criticism of prioritarianism, see for instance Harsanyi (1975).
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ante prioritarian decision maker cares about the difference in expected utili-
ties ex ante, before the risk is resolved. While the choice between the ex ante
and ex post criteria and its moral implications have been discussed exten-
sively in the literature (Diamond 1967, Broome 1984, Fleurbaey 2010, Adler
2012, Fleurbaey and Bovens 2012), its economic and policy implications have
not been thoroughly examined.2
Our results are relevant for the debate about climate change policy. One
important issue in this debate concerns the intergenerational equity dimen-
sion. Another important issue concerns the risk dimension. Very often how-
ever, these issues are treated independently in the climate change literature.
And when treated simultaneously, a utilitarian SWF has usually been as-
sumed both in the theoretical and empirical literature (Stern 2007, Dasgupta
2008, Nordhaus 2008, Weitzman 2008, Gollier 2012).3
In this paper, we want to stress the importance and the richness of the ex
ante/ex post prioritarian approach for economic problems that combine risk
and equity dimensions. To do so, we consider a simple consumption model,
often known as the cake eating problem. The model can be interpreted as
follows. A decision maker must split a cake among different agents who
come sequentially (e.g., among different generations). Under certainty, the
problem is trivial, and the cake is equally shared (because the agents are
identical). But the problem is that the size of the cake is unknown. If the
decision maker is prioritarian rather than utilitarian, should he give more or
less of the cake to the first agent, given that the remaining portion of the
cake is unknown?
The main result of the paper is that the answer is opposite depending
on whether the decision maker uses an ex ante or an ex post prioritarian
approach. Under standard assumptions on the form of the utility function
() and on the prioritarian SWF transformation (), the decision maker
should always give more to the first agent under ex ante prioritarianism than
under utilitarianism, but always less under ex post prioritarianism. We also
show that this result is robust to a situation in which the decision maker may
learn the size of the cake after the first decision has been made.
2Exceptions include Ulph (1982), Adler, Hammitt and Treich (2012) and Fleurbaey
and Bovens (2012), all in the context of mortality risk policies.
3Some exceptions include Johansson-Stenman (2000), Ha Duong and Treich (2004),
Bommier and Zuber (2008), Roemer (2008), Traeger (2012), Dietz and Asheim (2012) and
Fleurbaey and Zuber (2013).
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2 A simple consumption model
We consider two periods, and assume that the utility function  is identical
across the two periods, with  strictly increasing, strictly concave and thrice
differentiable. Under utilitarianism, the optimal consumption in the first
period, denoted   is defined by
 = argmax () +(e − )
where e is a random variable representing risk over the size of the “cake” (i.e.,
for instance over wealth, the stock of an exhaustible resource, or the green-
house gases total emissions target).4 We assume that e has a lower bound
inf  0. Since utility is strictly increasing, we have directly introduced into
the optimization program the fact that the cake will be fully consumed. The
first order condition (hereafter FOC) of this program gives5
0()−0(e − ) = 0 (2)
Note that the assumption 0(0) = +∞ is sufficient to ensure that it is never
optimal to run the risk of consuming entirely the cake before the final period.
Also, note that we have assumed implicitly that the remaining cake, e−, is
not productive. Moreover, recall that the utility is the same in both periods,
and observe that there is no discounting.6 These assumptions are made for
simplicity, and will play no role in the Propositions until Section 6.
It is well known from the precautionary savings literature that consump-
tion is reduced under risk, i.e.  ≤  
2
 if and only if (hereafter iff) the
decision maker is “prudent” 000 ≥ 0 (Leland 1968, Kimball 1990).7 Indeed,
under prudence, the marginal utility of wealth is higher under risk, and thus
it makes sense to transfer more wealth into the future when the risk will be
4A similar basic two-period consumption model has often been used in the literature
on climate change to illustrate the effect of growth risk on discounting (Weitzman 2009,
Gollier 2012, Millner 2013).
5Second order conditions will be satisfied throughout the paper, and thus will not be
discussed.
6Thus, the only source of heterogeneity across the two periods comes from the risk over
the future that makes future consumption risky. Note also that assuming no discounting
throughout will ensure that the utilitarian and prioritarian SWFs respect anonymity.
7Technically, the result holds iff 0( e− ) ≥ 0( e− ) for all e, namely iff marginal
utility is convex by Jensen inequality.
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faced. Note that the restriction 000  0 is necessary for the common de-
creasing absolute risk aversion (hereafter DARA) hypothesis, and is usually
accepted in the risk theory literature (Gollier 2001).
3 Ex ante prioritarianism
Under ex ante prioritarianism (hereafter EAP), optimal consumption is de-
fined by
 = argmax (()) + ((e − ))
where  is strictly increasing, strictly concave and thrice differentiable. Note
that the decision maker maximizes the sum of transformed expected utilities,
consistent with an ex ante approach. The optimal level of consumption is
characterized by the following FOC:
( ) ≡ 0(( ))0( )− 0((e−  ))0(e−  ) = 0 (3)
There is more consumption under EAP than under utilitarianism, i.e.  ≥
  or equivalently () ≥ 0 which by using (2) holds iff
() ≤ (e − )
This leads to the following result.
Proposition 1 There is more consumption under EAP than under utilitar-
ianism iff  is DARA.
Proof: Under DARA, −0 is more risk averse than . Namely, we have
 = (−0) with  strictly increasing and convex. This leads to
(e − ) = (−0(e − ))
≥ (−0(e − ))
= (−0())
= ()
which proves the inequality above. We now show the necessity. If  is not
DARA, then  is locally concave, and the above inequality can be reversed
for a well chosen e. Therefore, consumption under EAP can then be lower
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than under utilitarianism. Q.E.D
The intuition is that, assuming utilitarianism, under DARA (and thus un-
der prudence) the reduction in current consumption due to risk implies that
the future expected utility is higher than the current utility. This in turn
gives an incentive to increase consumption in the first period under prioritar-
ianism. This result shows that under a standard assumption on the utility
function, prioritarianism leads to more, and not less, current consumption.8
In other words, this result indicates that a concern for equity (in the EAP
sense) means less concern for the risky future. If one views ex ante fairness
as socially desirable (Diamond 1967, Epstein and Segal 1991), our model
perhaps illustrates a surprising implication of this view.
Note also that under constant absolute risk aversion (hereafter CARA),
we have () = ( e − ) leading to  =  and thus to ( ) =
(e −  ). Namely, under CARA, the (expected) utilities are equal
across the two periods both under utilitarianism and under prioritarianism.
4 Ex post prioritarianism
Under ex post prioritarianism (hereafter EPP), optimal consumption is de-
fined by
 = argmax (()) +(( e − ))
Note that the decision maker now maximizes the expectation of transformed
utilities, consistent with an ex post approach. The FOC is given by
( ) ≡ 0(( ))0( )−0((e −  ))0(e −  ) = 0 (4)
Similar as before, there is less consumption under EPP than under EAP iff
( ) ≤ 0. In the following Proposition, we derive a sufficient condition
for this inequality.
Proposition 2 There is less consumption under EPP than under EAP when
000 ≥ 0.
8Since there is more consumption under EAP than under utilitarianism, one may won-
der whether it is possible that there is more consumption under EAP than under certainty
(under either utilitarianism or prioritarianism). It is straightforward to show that this is
never the case under 000 ≥ 0, and that there is thus always precautionary savings.
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Proof: Let e −  ≡ e. Then observe that ( ) ≤ 0 iff
0((e))0(e) ≤ 0((e))0(e)
Observe now that 0((e))0(e) = 0((e))0(e) + (0((e)) 0(e)),
and since 0(()) and 0() are both decreasing in , the covariance term is
positive. Therefore the result holds if 0((e)) ≤ 0((e)) which is the
case iff 000 ≥ 0 by Jensen inequality. Q.E.D.
Is the restriction 000 ≥ 0 plausible? At least, this restriction is technically
more plausible than the opposite 000  0. In fact, it can be shown that if
0()  0 and 00()  0 and if 000() has the same sign for all   0, then it
must be that 000()  0 (Menegatti 2001). Indeed a positive, decreasing and
concave 0 would have to cross the origin at some point (thus contradicting
0  0), as illustrated in Figure 1. Note that the standard Atkinsonian
function, i.e. () = (1 − )−11− with   0 and   0 (and () =
log  for  = 1), always displays 000 ≥ 0. An alternative is the negative
exponential function, i.e. () = −−, which also displays 000 ≥ 0.
 INSERT FIGURE 1 
Thus under commonly used SWFs, there is less consumption under EPP
than under EAP. The next objective is to examine whether there could be
less consumption under EPP than under utilitarianism. We know the answer
in the CARA case. Indeed, under  CARA, we have seen that consumption
under EAP is equal to that under utilitarianism. Therefore Proposition 2
indicates that consumption under EPP is also lower than under utilitarianism
under CARA when 000 ≥ 0. But we would want to sign the comparison in
the general case. The answer is given in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 There is less consumption under EPP than under utilitari-
anism iff
000()
−00() ≤ 3
−00()
0() + {
000(())
−00(())}
0() (5)
Proof: Let us define () = (()). We want to examine under which
conditions we have: 0()−0(e−) = 0 implies 0()−0(e−) ≤ 0.
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Now let −0() = (−0()) with  strictly increasing and concave. Then
−0( e − ) = (−0(e − ))
≤ (−0(e − ))
= (−0())
= −0()
Conversely, if  is locally convex, then it is possible to find a well chosen e so
that the inequality above is reversed. Therefore the necessary and sufficient
condition is that −0 is more concave than −0, or 000−00 ≥ 000−00 given that  is
itself more concave than . This condition is provided in the theorem 3.4 in
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (1994), which yields (5). Q.E.D
As shown in Table 1, our analysis so far has permitted to compare current
consumption levels under utilitarianism, EAP and EPP. Note that the com-
parison is unambiguous under 000 ≥ 0, except for the pair (   ) which
depends on a complex condition (5).
 CARA  DARA
 =  ≥  under 000 ≥ 0  ≥  ,  ≥  under 000 ≥ 0,  ≥  iff (5)
Table 1: Consumption levels under utilitarianism, EAP and EPP.
Why is condition (5) so complex? Denoting () = (()), the proof
shows that the comparison between EPP and utilitarianism depends on how
a change in preference from  to  affects precautionary savings. More pre-
cisely, it depends on whether more risk aversion, i.e. −000 ≤ −000 , leads to
more prudence, i.e. 000−00 ≤ 000−00 . This last implication explains why condition
(5) involves the third derivatives of both  and  as one needs to compute 000.
Although it sounds intuitive that a more risk averse agent should be more
prudent, this is not always the case (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger 1994). For
instance, one may change the degree of risk aversion of a quadratic utility
function without affecting the degree of prudence.9
Nevertheless, one can show that this condition is satisfied for most com-
monly used utility and social welfare functions. First, in the CARA case, we
9Moreover, here is an example where the condition (5) does not hold for some wealth
levels. Take () = −− and () = (1 − )−11− , then the condition is violated iff
wealth is below b = (1− 2) 11− .
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have 
000()
−00() =
−00()
0() , and the condition (5) is always satisfied under 000 ≥ 0,
consistent with what we said above. Under the most common Atkinsonian
SWF, () = (1 − )−11− with   0 and   0, the inequality (5)
reduces to 000()
−00() ≤ 3
−00()
0() + (1 +)
0()
() 
Interestingly, this last inequality exhibits three different utility curvature
coefficients, namely the familiar degrees of risk aversion and of prudence, as
well as the reciprocal of the degree of fear of ruin 0 (Foncel and Treich 2005).
This also shows that under an Atkinsonian SWF the comparative statics
analysis would not be affected by ratio-rescaling the utility function, namely
by replacing  by  with   0; indeed, none of the curvature coefficients
would be affected.10 Moreover, take for instance a constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) utility function () = (1−)−11− with  ∈ (0 1); then
the condition (5) is equivalent to (1−)+ ≥ 0, and is always satisfied under
our parametric assumptions.
Observe finally that the previous inequality is more likely to be satisfied
when the “inequity aversion” parameter  increases. At the limit when 
tends to infinity, i.e. for a Rawlsian-type SWF, the inequality (5) is always
satisfied. This observation also provides an intuition for the result. Indeed,
under EPP and a Rawlsian-type SWF, the decision maker’s objective is to
increase consumption in the worst state ex post (i.e., when e = inf), as
soon as the utility reached in that state is not higher than current utility.
He thus essentially chooses consumption such that () ≈ (inf − ). This
tends to yield less current consumption than under utilitarianism, given by
0() = 0(e − ), and to even less current consumption than under EAP
(under a Rawlsian-type SWF), given by () ≈ (e − ).
10This is not surprising since the Atkinsonian function is the only prioritarian SWF to
display the ratio-rescaling invariance property (Bossert and Weymark 2004, Adler 2012).
Namely, the ranking of prospects is unaffected by ratio-rescaling the utility function. Along
similar lines, under a negative exponential SWF, i.e. () = −−, the ranking of prospects
would not be affected by a change from  to +, and we can easily see that the inequality
(5) would remain unaffected by such a change either.
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5 A multi-periodic model
In this section, we briefly explore what happens in a specific multi-periodic
model. Suppose first that we add only one period. Then the objective under
utilitarianism becomes
max12
(1) + (2) +( e − 1 − 2)
Note that perfect smoothing is optimal in the early periods 1 = 2 = . The
problem of finding optimal current consumption then becomes
 = argmax 2() +(e − 2) (6)
Similarly, optimal consumptions under EAP and EPP are defined by
 = argmax 2(()) + (( e − 2)) (7)
 = argmax 2(()) +(( e − 2)) (8)
It is easy to see then that this leads to similar comparative statics results as
before. Considering more (than 3) periods would not change this result pro-
vided that perfect smoothing remains optimal in the early periods. However,
the situation becomes more complex if learning is allowed, as we now show.
6 Learning
Learning is an important factor affecting risk policies (see for example the
literature on climate change policy; Ulph and Ulph 1997 and Gollier, Jullien
and Treich 2000). Unlike in the previous section, we now assume perfect
learning between periods 2 and 3. That is, in period 2, the realization of e
is known. Then the period 2 problem is made under certainty, and perfect
smoothing is optimal in the future either under prioritarianism or under
utilitarianism. Hence, viewed from the first period, optimal future (risky)
consumption equals
∗2 = e − 12 
Using obvious notations, the optimal consumption in the first period for
utilitarianism and EPP are then defined as follows (the EAP case is treated
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later)
 = argmax () + 2(
e − 
2
)
 = argmax (()) + 2((
e − 
2
))
Note that the effect of learning under utilitarianism, and under prioritarian-
ism, is given by comparing  to  in (6) and  to  in (8). It is
not very difficult to show that learning usually increases consumption under
utilitarianism and EPP compared to the no learning (i.e., “risk”) case.11 The
intuition is that learning allows to better smooth consumption in the future,
which thus increases future expected utility. As a result, there is more early
consumption under learning because there is less need to worry about the
future (Epstein 1980, Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Treich 2005).
Assuming learning, we now want to compare consumption under utilitari-
anism and EPP, i.e.  and . This amounts to compare precautionary
savings under () and () = (()), and this comparison is direct from pre-
vious Proposition 3.
Proposition 4 Under learning, there is less consumption under EPP than
under utilitarianism iff (5) holds.
The case of EAP is more difficult. Indeed, viewed from the first period,
future utility equals ( −
2
) and is risky, which matters under EAP. Optimal
consumption is given by
 = argmax (()) + 2((
e − 
2
)) (9)
11Let us first compare consumption under learning and under risk assuming utilitar-
ianism. Under learning, the FOC is given by 0() − 0( −2 ) = 0, while under risk
it is given by 0() − 0( e − 2) = 0. Thus there is more current consumption under
learning iff 0( e − 2) ≥ 0( −2 ) given that 0() − 0( e − 2) = 0. Observe now0( e − 2) = 120() + 120( e − 2) ≥ 0( −2 ) by Jensen inequality and 000 ≥ 0.
This leads to the result that under prudence learning increases early consumption under
utilitarianism. Note then that the role of learning under EPP is similar by just replacing
 by  = () in the previous reasoning. But then observe that 000 ≥ 0 ensures 000 ≥ 0 so
the result also carries over under 000 ≥ 0 and 000 ≥ 0. Note finally that both results rely
on our assumptions that utility is homogenous, and that there is no discounting (which
ensures anonymity).
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The problem here is that the EAP criterion is time-inconsistent (Broome
1984, Adler and Sanchirico 2006). This relates to the fact that the intertem-
poral utility function in (9) is not linear in probabilities (Hammond 1983,
Epstein and Le Breton 1992).12 Indeed, unlike under utilitarianism or EPP,
the optimization problem over the three periods cannot be formulated recur-
sively under EAP.
Observe now that comparing, under learning, consumption under utili-
tarianism and under (time-inconsistent) EAP is similar as comparing those
criteria under no learning. DARA is, again, the instrumental condition on
the utility function that drives the analysis.
Proposition 5 Under learning, there is more consumption under EAP than
under utilitarianism iff  is DARA.
Proof: We want to compare  and . Respective FOCs equal
0(())0()−0(( −
2
))0( −
2
) = 0 and 0()−0( −
2
) = 0. Therefore
we are done if we can show () ≤ ( −
2
) with 0() = 0( −
2
). By a
similar reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1, this holds iffDARA. Q.E.D.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined a simple consumption model under risk
with a prioritarian social welfare function. We have shown that under stan-
dard assumptions on utility and social welfare functions (which include the
familiar constant relative risk aversion utility and Atkinsonian social welfare
functions), prioritarianism always leads to more current consumption un-
der an ex ante approach, but to less current consumption under an ex post
approach, than under utilitarianism.
Why is this result interesting? Many economic problems combine a risk
and an equity dimension. Consider the general idea that future risks over
climate change should justify less consumption of energy today. The tradi-
tional argument in the economics of discounting under utilitarianism relies
12Note that this nonlinearity might also imply a negative value of information (Wakker
1988). But we can show that this is not the case. Indeed the utility reached under learning
(see (9)) is always higher than the one reached under risk (see (7)) iff (( −2 )) ≥
1
2 ((()) + (( −2 )). This inequality always holds under  and  concave by simply
applying twice the Jensen inequality.
12
on a precautionary savings motive. Our paper shows that this argument is
reinforced by a moral prioritarian argument only under the ex post approach,
but is weakened under the ex ante approach. Note also that the ex ante ap-
proach, although it respects individual expected utilities, has the additional
drawback that it leads to time-inconsistent consumption rules.
13
0 u
g’(u)
g’’’(u)<0
g’’’(u)>0
Figure 1:
This figure illustrates that the conditions 0()  0, 00()  0 together
with 000()  0 for all   0 are mutually inconsistent.
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